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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims.1
Suppose that a Manhattan mafia boss contacts a hit man
located in the Bronx and asks him to kill a police informant. Suppose
further that the hit man commits the murder at the informant's
apartment in Queens. Should the federal government care that the
mafia boss contacted the hit man using a cellular telephone rather
than a hand-delivered letter? Should it matter that the cellular signal
was transmitted by a cellular tower located in Newark, New Jersey
rather than Nyack, New York? Should the federal government care
that the mafia boss pays the hit man by wiring money through
Western Union rather than by handing him a bag full of cash? Finally,
should it matter that the Western Union transmission was routed
through a service center in Nashua, New Hampshire rather than
Nanuet, New York?2
Common sense suggests that the answers to these questions
should be an unequivocal "no." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's
1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
2. These scenarios were derived from hypothetical fact patterns conceived by the late
Judge Henry J. Friendly. Judge Friendly used these hypothetical fact patterns to demonstrate
that commerce-based jurisdiction often hinges on arbitrary and seemingly inconsequential
factual distinctions. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain on Tough on Crime: Some
Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L.
REV. 503, 514 n.63 (1995) (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
59 (1973)).
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Commerce Clause 3 jurisprudence dictates that these trivial factual
distinctions are critical in determining whether federal criminal
jurisdiction is proper. Thus, it is not surprising that these exact
questions proved to be outcome-determinative in two recent cases,
United States v. Marek4 and United States v. Weathers.5
This Note utilizes Marek and Weathers to illustrate one
significant limitation of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Namely, current Supreme Court jurisprudence permits
Congress to regulate purely local, garden-variety crimes that have
taken on interstate characteristics merely because a defendant utilizes
a cellular phone, paging device, Internet message, Western Union
transmission, or other interstate communication device in furtherance
of the crime. 6 These interstate communication devices, which have
been deemed "channels" or "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce
by the federal courts, 7 provide the basis for federal jurisdiction.
A brief discussion of Marek and Weathers demonstrates the
nature of the problem. In both Weathers and Marek, the defendants
had been convicted of violating the federal murder-for-hire statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1958.8 Section 1958 imposes criminal sanctions on anyone
who "uses or causes another to use ... any facility in interstate or
foreign commerce."9 The defendants in both cases challenged their
convictions on constitutional grounds alleging, inter alia, that the
government failed to satisfy § 1958's commerce-based jurisdictional
requirement. 10
In Marek, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's use of
Western Union in furtherance of a murder-for-hire scheme satisfied
the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958, even though the wire
3. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power "[tio regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 813 (2001).
5. 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 (1999).
6. For purposes of this Note, the term "interstate communication device" refers to
telephones, facsimile machines, computers, paging devices, Western Union, and other similar
devices.
7. See, e.g., Marek, 238 F.3d at 317 (concluding that when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958, it was regulating and protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Weathers,
169 F.3d at 342 (concluding implicitly that when Congress enacted § 1958, it was regulating the
channels of interstate commerce).
8. Marek, 238 F.3d at 313-14; Weathers, 169 F.3d at 337.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000). The statute also requires that the murder be committed as
consideration for pecuniary value.
10. Marek, 238 F.3d at 313-14; Weathers, 169 F.3d at 337. Section 1958's jurisdictional
element requires that the defendant "[travel] in interstate or foreign commerce, or [cause]
another [including the intended victim] to use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce." § 1958(a).
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transfer was initiated and terminated in the State of Texas.1 The
court paid little attention to the potentially momentous constitutional
questions implicated in the case, choosing instead to focus on matters
of statutory construction. 12 The court ultimately concluded that
federal jurisdiction under § 1958 was supplied by the nature of the
facility used, rather than by separate proof of actual interstate
contact.13 Having concluded that Western Union was "a quintessential
facility in interstate commerce," the court upheld Marek's conviction
even though the prosecution offered no proof that the Western Union
transmission ever crossed the Texas state line. 14 In dicta, the court
suggested that § 1958's jurisdictional element, which included all
"means of transportation and communication,"'15 would be satisfied by
the intrastate use of a telephone, automobile, airplane, or automated
teller machine ("ATM"). 16
The court in Marek, however, split from the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of § 1958 in Weathers. In Weathers, the court had held
that the defendant's use of a cellular telephone in furtherance of a
murder-for-hire scheme satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of
§ 1958, despite the fact that both parties to the telephone call were
located within the State of Kentucky. 17 The court reached this
conclusion merely because completion of the call required that an
electronic search signal be sent to cellular communications equipment
in both Kentucky and Indiana.18 Resolving the case largely as a
matter of statutory construction, the Sixth Circuit held that the
jurisdictional requirement of § 1958 requires that the defendant use a
facility of interstate commerce in a manner that involves an actual
interstate contact. 19 Thus, it would not be sufficient that the
defendant used a facility that was merely capable of making interstate
contact.20 The court upheld Weathers's conviction, however, because
11. 238 F.3d at 312-13, 320.
12. This does not imply, however, that the Marek court should have engaged in a thorough
constitutional analysis. Part V.A of this Note explains that many federal criminal statutes,
including § 1958, are virtually exempt from constitutional review under the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part V.C of this Note ultimately recommends that the Supreme
Court modify its Commerce Clause jurisprudence so that § 1958 and similar federal statutes are
subject to constitutional review.
13. Marek, 238 F.3d at 317, 320.
14. Id. at 313, 320.
15. Section 1958's definition section indicates that "facility of interstate commerce" includes
"means of transportation and communication." § 1958(b).
16. Marek, 238 F.3d at 318-19 nn.35-37.
17. United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 337 (6th Cir. 1999).
18. Id. at 341-42.
19. Id. at 340-42.
20. Id. at 341-42.
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his cellular phone caused an actual, albeit tenuous and incidental,
interstate contact.21
At first glance, the split of authority created by Marek and
Weathers appears to be an isolated problem of statutory construction. 22
Beyond the statutory construction issue, however, there is a much
larger constitutional issue looming in the background that threatens
to usher in a new era of federalization under the Commerce Clause.
The reasoning from Marek suggests that federal criminal jurisdiction
is proper as long as the defendant uses a "means of communication"
that could hypothetically cause an interstate contact.23 Following
Marek to its logical conclusion, the federal government would have the
power to investigate and prosecute any murder-for-hire scheme that is
facilitated by Western Union, a cellular telephone, a paging device, or
an Internet transmission, regardless of whether any human being or
electronic signal ever crosses state lines. 24
The holding in Weathers, while somewhat less troublesome
than the holding in Marek, suggests that federal authorities would
have jurisdiction over all of the same crimes, as long as the
prosecution can prove an actual interstate contact, no matter how
tenuous and incidental. 25 This additional requirement would create
little difficulty for the prosecution, however, since even a simple
telephone call now requires a "complex system of microwave radios,
fiber optics, satellites, and cables" that "typically bears no relation to
state boundaries."26 Thus, by requiring proof of actual interstate
21. Id. at 342.
22. Scholars have already written extensively on the split of authority created by Weathers
and Marek. See, e.g., Christopher Lieb Nybo, Dialing M for Murder: Assessing the Interstate
Commerce Requirement for Federal Murder for Hire, 2001 U. CHI. L. FORUM 579 (2001); Jason
Weathers, The National Significance of a Local Killing: When Does "Interstate" Mean Intrastate
Under the Federal Murder for Hire Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958?, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 97
(2002).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b).
24. The Marek court did not explicitly discuss cellular phones, pagers, or the Internet.
Nonetheless, it suggests that § 1958's jurisdictional element is satisfied if the defendant uses any
"means of transportation or communication" that is capable of causing an interstate contact. 238
F.3d at 318-19. It is evident that cellular phones, pagers, and Internet transmissions constitute
"means of communication" that are capable of causing electronic signals to travel across state
borders.
25. See Weathers, 169 F.3d at 342 (explaining that it would focus on "evidence regarding the
technical aspects of the operation of Weathers's cellular telephone" to determine whether it
caused an actual out-of-state contact).
26. United States v. Stevens, 842 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Goldberg v. Sweet,
488 U.S. 252, 255 (1989)); see also United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584, 589 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (explaining that an intrastate E-mail may necessarily involve an interstate contact
because of the structure of the Internet) (citing G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
THE INTERNET 31-32 (1995)).
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commerce, the Weathers decision does not alleviate the grave
constitutional concerns implicated in Marek. Under these cases,
Congress's power to regulate crime increases exponentially with each
new development in communication technology. 27
Part II of this Note will examine the ongoing debate regarding
the federalization of the criminal law. This Note ultimately concludes
that the federalization of purely local, garden-variety crimes
contravenes the text of the Constitution and threatens to disrupt the
delicate balance between federal and state law enforcement. In
addition, this Note argues that the federal government should
dedicate its scarce resources to complex crime schemes that transcend
state and national borders.
In Part III, this Note offers a detailed analysis of the Weathers
and Marek opinions. These cases are used to demonstrate that
Congress is often permitted to regulate purely local, garden-variety
crimes that have taken on interstate characteristics merely because
the defendant utilizes an electronic communication device that causes
tenuous, ephemeral interstate contacts. More importantly, the
decisions in Marek and Weathers demonstrate that many federal
27. These grave constitutional concerns are also implicated in cases involving various other
federal criminal statutes, including the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). See, e.g.,
United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming wire fraud conviction where
defendant fraudulently induced victims to send money via Western Union from one location in
Texas to another location in Texas, but where the government offered proof that the wire
transmission was routed through a Western Union processing center outside of Texas); United
States v. Davila, 592 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370
(8th Cir. 1985) (affirming wire fraud conviction where defendant sent Western Union
transmission from one location in Missouri to another location in Missouri, but where wire
transfer was processed by Western Union facility located in Virginia); see also United States v.
Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Utah 1998) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(2000), which prohibits persons from sending threatening messages in interstate commerce,
where defendant sent threatening E-mail to victim located in the same state, but where the
message was routed through an America Online processing facility in Virginia). In the interest of
brevity, I do not discuss these cases in the body of this Note. Nonetheless, these cases pose the
same threat of overfederalization as those arising under § 1958. Thus, the two reformulated
Commerce Clause standards proposed in Part V of this Note would apply to, and change the
outcome of, various cases arising under the wire fraud statute as well.
Finally, it is necessary to note that the federal courts have unanimously agreed that
intrastate communications may form the basis for federal criminal jurisdiction under the mail
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997) (holding that the jurisdictional element of the mail fraud
statute was satisfied where the defendant, an attorney, used the U.S. mail to deliver fraudulent
invoices to clients located within the same state); United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978) (holding that fraudulent medical bills delivered to
insurance companies via U.S. mail constituted wire fraud, even though mailings were intrastate
and purely local). These cases are irrelevant to this Note, however, because the mail fraud
statute is based on Congress's postal power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. This Note focuses
exclusively on federal jurisdiction under Congress's commerce power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
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criminal statutes, including the murder-for-hire statute, are virtually
exempt from meaningful constitutional review under the Supreme
Court's existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Part IV provides an overview of the Supreme Court's modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, with special emphasis on the three-
category analytical framework delineated in United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison. In Part V, this Note demonstrates that
the three-category framework permits Congress to convert its
commerce power into a plenary police power of the sort retained by the
states. Indeed, Part V demonstrates that federal criminal statutes are
exempt from meaningful constitutional review, as long as (i) the
statutes contain an express jurisdictional element or (ii) the statutes
are deemed to be regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.
Finally, in Part VI, I propose two reformulated Commerce
Clause standards that are designed to prevent further federalization
of criminal law. I ultimately conclude that the Supreme Court should
add a fourth category to the Lopez/Morrison framework. That category
would encompass cases such as Marek and Weathers, where the
jurisdictional element of a federal criminal statute allegedly is
satisfied by the defendant's use of an interstate communication
facility. Under my proposed standard, Congress would be permitted to
regulate such crime schemes only when the parties to the
communication are located in different states.
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF STATE CRIME: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
For many years, members of the legal community have debated
whether federalization of state crime is desirable or, more
importantly, constitutionally permissible. Although the debate
continues, one point has become clear: The vast majority of federal
judges and academics agree that Congress has used its commerce
power to "overfederalize" criminal law.28  Federal judges and
28. In a recent article, Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton argued that crime has not been
overfederalized but cataloged an extensive list of federal judges and academics who have voiced
opposition to the federalization process. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization
of Crime, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLy' 247, 247 n.1 (2000). More importantly, perhaps, they
located only one published article that supported the federalization trend. Interestingly, that
article was published by two federal prosecutors. Id. (citing Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg,
Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SCI. 72
(1996)).
Among the judges who have voiced opposition to the federalization trend are Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia. See Stephen
2003]
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academics are particularly hostile to recent congressional efforts to
vest the national government with concurrent jurisdiction over violent
street crimes, which have traditionally been within the exclusive
authority of state law enforcement officials.29
The critics of the federalization trend note that the United
States Code now contains more than three thousand federal crimes, 30
including domestic violence, 31  prostitution, 32  kidnapping,33  and
murder.34 The United States Code also includes a number of trivial
offenses, such as bringing false teeth into a state without the approval
of a local dentist 35 and reproducing the image of "Smokey the Bear"
Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN.
L. REV. 455, 466 (1994). In addition, the "Federal Judicial Center's 1992 Survey of Federal
Judges showed that 91.5% of active district court judges and 89% of the current active circuit
judges expressed strong or moderate support for narrowing of criminal jurisdiction to reduce
prosecution of ordinary street crime in federal court." Stacy & Dayton, supra, at 247 n.2 (internal
quotations omitted) (citing William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of
the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 652 n.3 (1994)).
The list of academics who have criticized the federalization trend is also extensive. Professors
Dayton and Stacy cited twelve articles supporting this view. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown,
Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789 (1996); Phillip B.
Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles,
Questions, and Cautions, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103 (1996); Sara Sun Beale,
Too Many and yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The
Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995); Sanford Kadish,
Comment, The Folly of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247 (1995); William P. Marshall,
Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (1995); Mengler, supra note 2;
Chippendale, supra.
29. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 28, at 248. Although federal law now proscribes many
garden-variety crimes, state and local authorities still prosecute ninety-five percent of violent
street crimes. See Mengler, supra note 2, at 516 (citing OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., COMBATING
VIOLENT CRIME: 24 RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (July 1992)).
30. Beale, supra note 28, at 980 n.10 (explaining that this figure was taken from Miner's
1992 article and that, since that time, Congress has enacted statutes defining many new
criminal offenses) (citing Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 681 (1992)).
31. Federal law provides criminal penalties for any "person who travels in interstate or
foreign commerce ... with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse or intimate
partner." 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000). If the federal government is unable to prove the requisite
nexus with interstate commerce, the states retain exclusive jurisdiction.
32. Federal law proscribes "knowingly transport[ing] any individual in interstate or foreign
commerce ... with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity."
18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000). If the federal government is unable to prove the requisite nexus with
interstate commerce, the states retain exclusive jurisdiction.
33. Federal law provides criminal penalties for any person who "unlawfully seizes ...
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward.., any person." 18 U.S.C. §
1201 (2000). To exercise jurisdiction, the federal government must prove a requisite nexus with
interstate or foreign commerce, controlled airspace, or the high seas. § 1201.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000).
35. Mengler, supra note 2, at 527 n.117 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988)).
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without permission. 36  According to many commentators, the
explanation for the recent "explosion" of federal criminal law is
relatively straightforward: Members of Congress understand that
"getting tough on crime ... is simply good politics." 37
The text of the Constitution, on the other hand, suggests that
the federal government should have a very limited role in the realm of
criminal law. 38 In fact, the Constitution "expressly grants Congress
the authority to punish only four types of criminal conduct."39
Moreover, the Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution ... are reserved to the
States."40
It is necessary to note, however, that proponents of the
federalization trend also find support in the text of the Constitution.
Indeed, the Constitution grants Congress authority to "make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution" its
enumerated powers.41 One of Congress's enumerated powers is to
"regulate ... commerce among the several States."42 The proponents
of federalization argue that many local activities, including crime,
have a dramatic impact on the national economy.43 Thus, they believe
36. Id. at 527 n.116 (citing § 711). The federal government provides criminal penalties
because Smokey's image is owned by the United States Forest Service.
37. Ashdown, supra note 28, at 802-03; see also Mengler, supra note 2, at 504 (explaining
that Congress's decision to criminalize conduct already within the purview of state law reflects
the fact that "we live at a time when legislators, state as well as federal, are zealous in their
efforts to be tough on crime, or at least to create the appearance of toughness"); William H.
Rehnquist, Seen in A Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 7
(1993) (observing that "hardly a congressional session goes by without an attempt to add new
[criminal] sections"); Chippendale, supra note 28, at 467 n.63 (" 'Every two years, right before an
election, Congress seems to pass a crime bill.' ") (citing Is Crime Killing America?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 15, 1994, at 3).
38. See Mengler, supra note 2, at 508 ("There is no suggestion in the Constitution or in the
Framers' debates that the federal government was to have a significant role in prosecuting
crimes affecting the local community.").
39. See Chippendale, supra note 28, at 456 n.10 (explaining that "the Constitution
authorizes Congress to punish counterfeiting, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6, piracy on the high
seas, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, crimes committed on federal property, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 17, and treason, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3"); see also Mengler, supra note 2, at 508 ("By
expressly enumerating only a few circumstances in which Congress may enact criminal statutes,
the United States Constitution itself reflects the perspective that the burden of criminal law
enforcement should largely reside with the states.").
40. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
41. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
42. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
43. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 28, at 249 (explaining that, according to a recent study,
crime costs the nation approximately $500 billion per year) (citing TED R. MILLER ET AL., VICTIM
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK (1996)).
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that Congress should be permitted to enact criminal statutes designed
to protect our nation's highly interdependent economy.
Since the text of the Constitution is not conclusive, critics of
the federalization process often resort to tradition, arguing that that
overfederalization offends American traditions of federalism. 44 These
critics believe that the constitutionally mandated division of authority
between the federal and state governments reflects the Framers' belief
that "[d]ifferent laws, opinions, and beliefs exist in different states" 45
and that "the national government could not possibly account for such
a multiplicity of local interests."46 Further, they believe that the
Framers adopted the Tenth Amendment to reserve to each state the
power to "address its unique 'local' concerns and objectives." 47 Indeed,
the critics of federalization argue that "no one can seriously contend
that the Framers envisioned that the federal government would be as
involved as it currently is in the prosecution and adjudication of
criminal behavior in the United States. 48
Proponents of the federalization trend contend that reliance on
"tradition" is not justified. Professors Stacy and Dayton have argued
that the difficulties of "defining, identifying, and using tradition make
relying upon it standardless." 49  Moreover, they cite "counter-
44. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("Under our federal system, the
'[sitates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.' ") (quoting
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)); Beale, supra note 28, at 994-95 (explaining
that "the values promoted by federalism, which have great force in the context of criminal
enforcement, are threatened by the seemingly inexorable expansion of federal criminal law" and
suggesting that "[plerhaps the most obvious aspect of the division of power is that the United
States has no single police force").
45. Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27 n.107 (1999) (citing PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 288 (Lee) (Paul Ford ed., 1888)).
46. Id. (citing MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 357 (Madison)
(1911)).
47. Id. at 26.
48. Mengler, supra note 2, at 508; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 113 ("[T]he
Founders understood [that] only state officials can respond directly to local concerns on subjects
that reflect social, moral, and cultural views, such as crime and family law."). The writings of
James Madison tend to confirm these scholarly observations. Madison eloquently explained that
"[tihe powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the states are numerous and indefinite . . The powers reserved to the states will
extend to all objects which ... concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clint Rossiter ed., 1961).
49. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 28, at 272. One other scholar noted similar concerns,
explaining that "traditions are multifaceted and rich, permitting a range of normative claims to
be couched in historical practices but varying significantly." Id. at 273 (citing Judith Resnik,
History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and
Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 217-18 (1995)).
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traditions" that may in fact support the federalization of certain
crimes. They note, for example, that federal regulation of firearms
dates back to 1934.50 In a similar vein, many scholars have criticized
efforts to interpret the Constitution in light of the Framers' intent.
51 It
could hardly be argued, for example, that the Framers envisioned a
national economy, homogenous states, and mass interstate
transportation when they drafted the Commerce Clause.
Notwithstanding these competing constitutional and historical
considerations, practical considerations tip the scale in favor of very
limited federal criminal jurisdiction. In recent years, the federal
judiciary has been flooded with an unmanageable criminal docket.
Between 1980 and 1992, the number of criminal cases filed in the
federal courts increased by seventy percent, and the number of
defendants prosecuted rose seventy-eight percent. 52 More importantly,
criminal cases now consume half of the federal judiciary's total time.53
The avalanche of criminal filings not only disrupts the operation of the
federal courts but also robs civil litigants of necessary judicial
resources.54 The Speedy Trial Act, which requires dismissal of
criminal charges if they are not tried within seventy days, forces the
federal judiciary to give priority to their criminal docket. 55
Consequently, federal judges are forced to put civil cases on the back
50. Id. at 273.
51. For scholarly criticism of originalist interpretations of the Constitution, see, e.g.,
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Rebecca Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE
L.J. 177 (1993).
52. Beale, supra note 28, at 984. Professors Stacy and Dayton have argued that these
"statistics provide no support whatsoever for the claim that the national government's crime
fighting role has grown, much less that the growth has been rapid and unrestrained." Stacy &
Dayton, supra note 28, at 260. They explain, for example, that felony filings in state courts
increased by sixty-four percent from 1984 to 1994, while federal felony filings increased by only
thirty-two percent during the same period. Id. at 253. These statistics assume, of course, that
"federalization" has not occurred unless the felony filings in federal courts grow at the same rate
as the felony filings in state courts. This is a highly questionable assumption in light of the fact
that most crimes involve purely local conduct. Professors Stacy and Dayton also attempt to
undermine the significance of the federalization trend by explaining that the federal prison
population constituted only 7.8% of the total population of prisoners in the United States in
1994, down from an average of 11.7% in the 1940s. Id. at 258. These statistics assume that
federalization has not occurred unless the federal prison population grows at the same rate as
the state prison population. For the reasons previously stated, this is also a highly questionable
assumption.
53. In some districts, such as the Southern District of Florida, the criminal docket
constitutes eighty-four percent of the federal judiciary's caseload. See Beale, supra note 28, at
985 n.22.
54. See id. at 984-88 (explaining that federal courts dedicate a vast amount of time and
attention to criminal trials, thereby depriving civil litigants of adequate judicial resources).
55. Id. at 987-88 (describing the effect of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (1985)).
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burner until pending criminal matters have been resolved. In the end,
many civil litigants are deprived of "the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" envisioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 56
Most important, perhaps, is that the scarce resources of the
federal government have been dedicated to simple street crimes,
rather than complex crimes that transcend state and national
boundaries. Federal prosecutors, as well as their counterparts in the
federal judiciary, spend a significant amount of time dealing with drug
offenses, firearm offenses, arson cases, carjacking cases, and other
local crimes.57 Often, these offenses have only a tenuous nexus with
interstate commerce and an even less pronounced effect on the
national economy.
It would be more efficient to allocate federal resources to
complex, multistate crimes that truly implicate national concerns. The
terrorism provisions of the Patriot Act 58 and the corporate fraud
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 59 are examples. It is beyond
question that terrorism and large-scale corporate fraud schemes have
a dramatic impact on the national economy. In addition, terrorism has
a significant impact on national security. These crimes are extremely
complex because they often involve a unique "interplay of business,
financial, and governmental institutions."60 Moreover, they often
transcend state boundaries in significant and tangible ways. Thus,
only the federal government has the expertise, resources, and
multijurisdictional authority to fight these crimes. Congress would
therefore be well advised to reallocate the federal judiciary's scarce
resources from local, garden-variety street crimes to sophisticated
white-collar crimes and terrorism issues that transcend state and
national borders.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON ELECTRONIC
IMPULSES: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEDERAL MURDER-FOR-
HIRE STATUTE
The following section contains a detailed analysis of the Marek
and Weathers opinions. These cases are used to demonstrate two
56. Chippendale, supra note 28, at 471 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
57. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 28, at 984 (Between 1980 and 1992, "the number of drug
cases filed in the federal courts roughly quadrupled, from 3,130 cases (6,678 defendants) to
12,833 cases (25,033 defendants). Firearm prosecutions also quadrupled, from 931 prosecutions
in 1980 to 3,917 in 1992.").
58. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (2001).
60. Mengler, supra note 2, at 518.
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deficiencies of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
First, many federal criminal statutes, including the murder-for-hire
statute, are exempt from meaningful constitutional review because
they contain an express jurisdictional element. The Marek and
Weathers decisions demonstrate that express jurisdictional elements
do little to ensure that the criminal conduct has an adequate nexus
with interstate commerce. Second, federal criminal statutes are
exempt from constitutional review, even when they are applied to local
offenses, as long as they are deemed to be regulations of the channels
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
A. United States v. Weathers: Ephemeral and Vaporous Interstate
Contacts are Sufficient
In United States v. Weathers, the defendant arranged for the
murder of a state law enforcement officer who was scheduled to testify
against him in an upcoming criminal trial.61 To facilitate the murder
scheme, Weathers used his cellular telephone to contact a man, whom
he believed to be a drug dealer and who was willing to commit the
murder in return for cash and drugs. 62 In fact, the drug dealer was an
undercover law enforcement agent who was investigating Weathers's
criminal activity. 63 During these telephone conversations, Weathers
arranged clandestine meetings with the law enforcement agent so that
they could discuss the details of the murder plan, arrange the delivery
of the murder weapon, and complete various drug deals.64 During all
of their telephone conversations, both Weathers and the undercover
law enforcement agent were located in the State of Kentucky.
65
During the trial, the government called an expert witness to
testify as to the manner in which Weathers's cellular phone
operated.66 The expert witness, who was employed by Weathers'
cellular service provider, had specialized training in the technical
functioning of the local cellular network.67 The expert testified that
the completion of the intrastate cellular phone call required that an
61. 169 F.3d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1999).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 338, 343.
65. Id. at 337.
66. Id. at 339.
67. Id.
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interstate paging signal be sent to communications equipment in both
Kentucky and Indiana.68
Based on the extensive evidence presented at trial, the jury
returned a guilty verdict. 69 Weathers appealed his conviction to the
Sixth Circuit, alleging, inter alia, that the government failed to satisfy
the commerce-based jurisdictional element of the murder-for-hire-
statute.70 He claimed that "even if the evidence demonstrated the use
of a facility in interstate commerce, that use was 'so ephemeral' and
'so vaporous' as to be virtually non-existent.' "71
The court of appeals never questioned whether the murder-for-
hire statute, as applied to the facts of the case, was constitutional.
Rather, it resolved the case largely as a matter of statutory
construction. 72 The court began its analysis by explaining that
§ 1958(a) and § 1958(b)(2) contained textual discrepancies that made
it difficult to interpret the statute's jurisdictional requirements. 73
Section 1958(a), the substantive section of the statute, prohibits a
person from using a "facility in interstate or foreign commerce" in
furtherance of a murder-for-hire scheme.7 4 The problem is that
§ 1958(b)(2), the definitional section of the statute, does not define the
phrase "facility in interstate commerce." 75 Rather, it provides a
definition of the phrase "facility of interstate commerce." 76 In effect,
the definitional section of the statute does not define the jurisdictional
phrase. 77
68. The Weathers opinion offers a highly detailed description of the technical operation of
the defendant's cellular phone. See id.
69. Id. at 337.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 339.
72. In Part V.A, I offer a detailed analysis to explain the reasons that the Marek court
resolved the case using statutory construction, rather than by analyzing the constitutionality of
§ 1958. At this point, it is sufficient to state that many federal criminal statutes are exempt from
constitutional review under the Supreme Court's current Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This
limitation ultimately supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court should reformulate its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See infra Part V.C.
73. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 340.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000) (emphasis added). "Whoever travels in or causes another
[including the intended victim] to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes
another [including the intended victim] to use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce, with intent that a murder be committed ... shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both." § 1958(a) (emphasis added).
75. See § 1958(b)(2) (emphasis added).
76. § 1958(b)(2) (emphasis added). "As used in this section.... 'facility of interstate
commerce' includes means of transportation or communication." § 1958(b)(2) (emphasis added).
77. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 340.
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The court emphasized that the "the distinction between 'in' and
'of interstate commerce... is critical."78 It explained that a statute
that "speaks in terms of an instrumentality in interstate commerce...
is intended to apply to interstate activities only. '79 A statute that
speaks in terms of "facilities of interstate commerce," on the other
hand, extends to intrastate activities involving an interstate
commerce facility.80 In effect, one of the phrases "stresses how the
facility is used under the particular facts, and the other stresses
whether the facility itself is a facility of interstate commerce."81 Thus,
it was unclear whether § 1958 required actual interstate use of a
facility under the particular facts of the case or, alternatively, whether
it required only that the defendant use a facility that typically is
involved in interstate commerce.8 2
The court ultimately resolved the textual discrepancies in the
murder-for-hire statute by concluding that "the key prohibition
creating the criminal offense is found in subsection (a)[,] and ... it
controls over the provision in subsection (b)."83 Since subsection (a)
included the phrase "facility in interstate commerce," rather than
"facility of interstate commerce," the court held that jurisdiction would
be proper only if the defendant's use of his cellular phone actually
involved an interstate contact.8 4 It was irrelevant that the cellular
network itself was interstate, in the sense that it was composed of a
nationwide network of equipment, or that it was capable of facilitating
interstate calls.8 5
The court explained that the undisputed evidence
demonstrated that "without [interstate search signals] ... the
transmission of a telephone call to or from Weathers's cellular
telephone would not have been possible."8 6 Thus, Weathers's use of his
78. Id. at 341.
79. Id. (citing United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1989)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 340.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 342.
84. Id. The Court noted that it was proper to "focus on the technical aspects of the operation
of Weathers's cellular phone, and the legal consequences flow[ing] therefrom." Id. at 342. The
Court noted that this approach was consistent with the approach taken in Fed. Power Comm'n u.
Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972), and emphasized that "the legal conclusions may
depend upon the evaluation of technical facts." Id. In that case, the Supreme Court's finding that
the Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction hinged on its determination that energy from
the Florida State Power Commission was "transferred into a 'bus,' the point of connection
between several regional utilities ... before it was sent to various out-of-state destinations." Id.
at 342 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 463).
85. See id. at 342.
86. Id.
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cellular phone involved an actual use of facilities in interstate
commerce. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.8 7
B. United States v. Marek and United States v. Cisneros: Just Look at
the Nature of the Facility, No Need to Search for Ephemeral or
Vaporous Contact
Less than a year after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Weathers,
the Fifth Circuit was asked to resolve the same issue: whether the
jurisdictional element of § 1958 required that a facility actually be
used in an interstate manner, or whether it required only that the
facility was itself a facility of interstate commerce. In two cases,
United States v. Mareks8 and United States v. Cisneros,8 9 panels of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached contradictory conclusions with
respect to that issue.90 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit voted to rehear
these cases en banc to reconcile the discrepancy and to establish a
consistent position with respect to the jurisdictional requirements of
§ 1958.91
1. United States v. Cisneros (Take One)
In United States v. Cisneros, the defendant asked her trusted
fortune-teller if she could find someone to murder her daughter's
former boyfriend.92 After engaging in numerous international
telephone calls between the United States and Mexico, the fortune-
teller located and employed two hit men. 93 The two men traveled from
Mexico and killed the intended victim in Texas. 94 The defendant was
subsequently convicted under § 1958 for using a facility in interstate
commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire. 95 Cisneros appealed
her conviction alleging, inter alia, that the government had failed to
provide sufficient evidence that she used a "facility in interstate or
foreign commerce." 96
In resolving the jurisdictional issue, the Fifth Circuit
recognized the difficulties caused by the textual discrepancies between
87. Id. at 344.
88. 198 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g granted, 206 F.3d. 449 (5th Cir. 2000).
89. 203 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2000), vacating 194 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 1999).
90. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2001).
91. Id.
92. 203 F.3d at 337-38.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 338.
95. Id. at 339.
96. Id.
292 [Vol. 56:277
ELECTRONIC IMPULSES
§§ 1958(a) and 1958(b).97 The panel noted that the phrase "facility in
interstate commerce," as included in § 1958(a), would require proof
that the facility employed in the instant case was actually used in the
process of interstate or foreign commerce. 98 Conversely, the phrase
"facility of interstate commerce," as used in § 1958(b), would not
require proof of actual interstate use since that wording encompasses
even intrastate use of facilities through which interstate commerce is
typically accomplished. 99
It was not necessary for the Cisneros court to decide which
jurisdictional phrase governed the case, however, because the result in
the case would have been the same under either textual
construction. 100 Cisneros's fortune-teller not only used a facility
through which international commerce typically was accomplished-a
"facility of interstate commerce"-but also used that facility in a
manner that actually affected the process of international commerce-
a "facility in interstate commerce." 101 The court suggested in dicta,
however, that the jurisdictional element of § 1958 should be
interpreted narrowly so as to require that a facility actually be used in
an interstate manner. 10 2 According to this interpretation, like the
court's interpretation in Weathers, intrastate use of a facility would
not suffice even if that facility were typically used in interstate
commerce.
2. United States v. Marek (Take Two)
In United States v. Marek, the defendant attempted to hire a
hit man to murder her boyfriend's mistress.'0 3 The defendant, Betty
Louise Marek, was arrested after she used Western Union to transfer
97. Id. at 340.
98. Id. The court used dictionary definitions to highlight the important differences between
the phrase "facility in interstate commerce" and "facility of interstate commerce." Id. The court
explained that the word "of' means "belonging or connected to," while "in" means "during the act
or process of." Id. (citing WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 557, 559 (1995)).
99. Id.
100. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Marek, 198 F.3d 532, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1999) (disregarding as dicta the Cisneros court's
conclusion that § 1958's jurisdictional requirement should be read narrowly to require that an
interstate commerce facility actually be used in an interstate manner).
101. See Marek, 238 F.3d at 314 (explaining that "[i]n Cisneros the subject telephone calls
were unquestionably international so the use of the telephone facility was international
("foreign"), as is the telephone facility itself.").
102. See Cisneros, 203 F.3d at 342. The Cisneros court explained that the "legislative history
plainly suggests that we should eschew the broader reading of the statute. Using the definition
in [§ 1958] (b) to interpret 'facility in interstate commerce' would extend the reach of the federal
murder-for-hire statute to new realms of traditionally-exclusive state jurisdiction." Id.
103. 198 F.3d at 533.
2932003]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
$500 to the putative hit man who, unbeknownst to Marek, was
actually an undercover police officer. 10 4 The wire transfer was initiated
in Houston, Texas and received in Harlingen, Texas.10 5
Despite the fact that the wire transfer was entirely intrastate,
Marek was indicted under § 1958 for using a facility in interstate
commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire. 106 Marek pled guilty
to the offense, and the district court sentenced her accordingly. 10 7
Marek later appealed the conviction on the grounds that the
prosecution failed to prove that she used a "facility in interstate
commerce" in the commission of the murder-for-hire scheme.108
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained that the issue was
"whether the use of Western Union's facilities by one party to transfer
funds to another party in the same state qualifies as the use of a
'facility in interstate commerce' as required by § 1958(a)." 10 9 The court
conceded that this issue had been addressed in Cisneros but concluded
that "any such discussion in Cisneros was dicta and is not binding on
this court's discussion .... 10
After analyzing the text of the statute and its legislative
history, and after applying rules of statutory construction, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that "a facility in interstate commerce" was
synonymous with the phrase "interstate commerce facility." '11
Accordingly, the court held that jurisdiction was proper if the
defendant utilized a facility that was ordinarily engaged in interstate
commerce, even if the facility was used entirely intrastate on the
particular occasion in question.'1 2 Applying that rule to the instant
case, the Fifth Circuit held that "regardless of the place of origin and
place of completion, the use of Western Union, quintessentially a
facility in interstate commerce and of interstate commerce as well,
satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958."113 This holding,
which was based on the nature of the facility rather than the manner
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 534.
110. Id. The discussion in Cisneros was dicta because "[t]hat case involved the international
use of a facility in foreign commerce. It was thus unnecessary for the Cisneros court to determine
whether an intrastate use of a common carrier ... that is itself a 'facility in interstate commerce'
was jurisdictionally sufficient." Id.
111. Id. at 535.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
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in which it was actually used, was in direct conflict with the Fifth
Circuit's dicta in Cisneros.
3. United States v. Marek (Take Three): Resolving the Split Within
the Fifth Circuit
Just one year after the Fifth Circuit decided Marek and
Cisneros, it voted to rehear both cases en banc in order to reconcile the
discrepancies regarding § 1958's jurisdictional requirements. 114 The
court noted from the outset that the Cisneros case did not present any
complex or novel issues of law, since it involved actual interstate use
of a facility that was ordinarily involved in interstate commerce. 115
Therefore, in Cisneros, it was unnecessary for the court to decide
whether intrastate use of an interstate facility satisfied § 1958's
jurisdictional requirements. 116 Marek, on the other hand, raised a
difficult jurisdictional issue, requiring the court to determine whether
the jurisdictional element of § 1958 required that "both (1) the facility
and (2) the defendant's use of the facility be in interstate or foreign
commerce."
11 7
In resolving the issue, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed the plain
language of the statute.1 " The court explained that "the key question
of statutory construction ... is whether ... under § 1958, the phrase
'in interstate or foreign commerce' modifies [the word] 'use' or modifies
[the word] 'facility.' "119 The court ultimately concluded that the
phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce" is "an adjective phrase that
modifies 'facility,' the noun that immediately precedes it-not an
adverbial phrase that modifies the syntactically more remote verb,
'[to] use.' "120 According to that interpretation, jurisdiction under
§ 1958 is based on the nature of the facility involved, rather than on
its actual use under the particular facts of the case.
The court next turned to § 1958's statutory context to
determine whether its jurisdictional requirements would be satisfied
by intrastate use of an interstate commerce facility. The court
explained that "when ... [Congress] adopted § 1958,... [it] was
acting within the second of three broad categories identified by the
114. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2001).
115. See id. at 314.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 315.
118. Id. at 315-16.
119. Id. at 316.
120. Id.
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Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez."121 The second Lopez
category empowered Congress "to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or person or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities."'122 The court then concluded that "[w]hen
Congress regulates and protects under the second Lopez category...
federal jurisdiction is supplied by the nature of the instrumentality or
facility used, not by separate proof of interstate movement."'123
The court also addressed the discrepancy between the wording
in § 1958(a), which uses the phrase "facility in interstate commerce,"
and the wording in § 1958(b)(2), which uses the phrase "facility of
interstate commerce." 124  The court explained, "[W]e find the
inconsistency between § 1958(a) and (b)(2) to. be more apparent than
real, and that use of slightly different phraseology in the clarification
section ... was not intended by Congress to limit the scope of the
statute."'125 The court buttressed its assertion by examining the
statute's legislative history. 26 In the Senate report, the court found
numerous instances in which the phrases "of interstate commerce"
and "in interstate commerce" were used interchangeably.127
Furthermore, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report made it clear
that "the gist of the offense is travel ... or the use of the facilities of
interstate commerce . *..."128 Finally, the court noted that the title of
121. Id. at 317. This determination was critical to the outcome of the case. In Part V.A, I
explain that statutes falling within the second Lopez category are virtually exempt from
constitutional scrutiny under the Supreme Court's existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
This helps to explain why the Marek court did not address the grave constitutional implications
of the case, choosing instead to focus on matters of statutory construction. This limitation
ultimately leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Court should reformulate its Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See infra Part LV.C.
122. Marek, 238 F.3d at 317 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
123. Id. The court also explained that the intrastate use of various other interstate
commerce facilities has been deemed sufficient to create federal criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 318.
The court cited United States v. Weathers, for example, for the proposition that "telephones, even
when used intrastate, constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce." Id. at 319 n.35
(citing United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1999)). In addition, the court cited
United States v. Baker, where the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional element of the
Travel Act was satisfied when an extortion victim withdrew cash from his local bank account
using another local bank's automated teller machine. Id. at 319 (citing United States v. Baker,
82 F.3d 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1996)). The court explained that "[t]hough [the victim's] withdrawal
triggered an entirely intrastate electronic transfer ... the jury found that [the defendant] caused
[the victim] to use a facility in interstate commerce." Id. (internal citations omitted).
124. Id. at 320.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 321.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 306 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3185).
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the statute "Use of Interstate Commerce Facilities in the Commission
of Murder-for-Hire," made it clear that federal jurisdiction is based on
the nature of the instrumentality used, not on separate proof of
interstate movement.129
Ultimately, the court concluded that "when a facility employed
to advance murder-for-hire is in interstate ... commerce generally,
the jurisdictional element of § 1958 is satisfied even though the
particular use of the facility on the specific occasion in question is only
intrastate."'1 30 Consequently, the court concluded that "both (1)
Marek's intrastate use of Western Union-a quintessential facility in
interstate commerce-to transfer funds within Texas and (2)
Cisneros's international phone calls, [were] sufficient to satisfy the
jurisdictional element of section 1958."131
IV. THE THREE-RING CIRCUS: CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITY THAT
CONGRESS MAY REGULATE USING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The courts in Marek and Weathers applied the murder-for-hire
statute to local crimes that, at best, had a very tenuous link to
interstate commerce. Neither court questioned whether the murder-
for-hire statute, as applied to predominantly intrastate crime,
exceeded Congress's commerce power. To understand why the courts
in Marek and Weathers eschewed a meaningful constitutional review
in favor of statutory construction, it is necessary to understand the
dynamics of the Supreme Court's three-category Commerce Clause
framework.
In two recent decisions, United States v. Lopez' 32 and United
States v. Morrison,133 the Supreme Court identified and explained
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate using
the Commerce Clause. 34 Specifically, the Court found that Congress
may regulate (i) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce, '' 35
(ii) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities,"1 36 and (iii) those activities "substantially
129. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000)).
130. Id. at 320.
131. Id. (emphasis in original).
132. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
133. 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
134. These three categories were originally delineated in the 1971 Supreme Court decision of
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). The Lopez and Morrison decisions, however,
represent the Court's most recent discussion of this three-category framework.
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
136. Id.
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affecting commerce."137 The Supreme Court did not explain what it
meant when it said that Congress could regulate the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Similarly, the Court did not
explain what activities substantially affect commerce. Instead, it cited
a number of prior cases that fit within each of the three categories.
In this Part, I offer a brief summary of the cases that the
Supreme Court cited to illustrate the three-category framework. This
background helps to explain why Marek and Weathers were resolved
largely as a matter of statutory construction with little attention to
underlying constitutional issues.
A. Ring One: Regulation of the Use of the Channels of Interstate
Commerce
In Lopez, the Court cited United States v. Darby138 and Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 39 to illustrate Congress's power to
regulate "the use of the channels of interstate commerce." 140 In Darby,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act
prohibiting, inter alia, the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
produced in violation of the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements.1 4 1 The Court recognized that Congress's true intention
might have been to regulate the conditions of intrastate
manufacturing.1 42 Nonetheless, the Court held that Congress,
"following its own conception of public policy, . . . is free to exclude
from commerce articles whose uses [are] . . . injurious to the public
health, morals or welfare." 143 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court
analyzed the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights of Act of
1964, prohibiting discrimination in hotels, motels, restaurants, and
other places of public accommodation.1 44 The Court examined the
statute's legislative history, which demonstrated that African-
Americans were often unable locate overnight accommodations. 145
Congress found that the unavailability of overnight accommodations
discouraged a large portion of the country's African-American
137. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
138. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
139. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
140. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 114, and Heart of Atlanta Motel,
379 U.S. at 256, as examples of Congress's ability to regulate the "channels of interstate
commerce").
141. See 312 U.S. at 100.
142. Id. at 113-15.
143. Id. at 114.
144. 379 U.S. at 247.
145. Id. at 252-53.
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community from engaging in interstate travel. 146 The Court upheld
the regulations based in part on a recognition that "the authority of
Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no
longer open to question."147
B. Ring Two: Regulation of the Instrumentalities of Interstate
Commerce, or Persons or Things in Interstate Commerce
To illustrate Congress's ability to regulate "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities," 148 Lopez cited the Shreveport Rate Cases.1 49 In
that case, numerous railroad companies challenged the
constitutionality of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") that prohibited the railroads from charging higher rates for
interstate shipments between Texas and Louisiana than they charged
for shipments within the State of Texas.1 50 The railroads argued that
the Commerce Clause did not permit the ICC to control intrastate
shipping rates, even "to the extent necessary to prevent injurious
discrimination against interstate traffic."151 The Court rejected this
argument, emphasizing that Congress had the authority to protect
commerce by requiring that "the agencies of interstate commerce ...
not be used in such manner as to cripple, retard or destroy it."152 The
Court ultimately held that Congress's power to regulate commerce
"extend[s] to these interstate carriers as instruments of interstate
commerce [and] necessarily embraces the right to control their
146. Id. at 253.
147. Id. at 256 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 424 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)); see also Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (explaining that Congress's power to regulate the use
of the channels of interstate commerce is illustrated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-15 (2000), which
prohibit the interstate shipment of stolen goods, and § 1201, which prohibits the interstate
shipment of persons who have been kidnapped); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-5, at 828 n.10 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that Congress's power to
regulate the use of the channels of commerce has also been recognized in Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308 (1913), and Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), in which the Supreme Court
upheld congressional bans on the interstate shipment of prostitutes and lottery tickets,
respectively)).
148. United States v. Morrision, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558 (1995).
149. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. The Shreveport Rate Cases is the popular name for Houston,
East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
150. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co., 234 U.S. at 346-49.
151. Id. at 350.
152. Id. at 351.
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operations in all matters having such a close and substantial relation
to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate."' 153
In addition to the Shreveport Rate Cases, the Lopez Court cited
two federal statutes to further elucidate Congress's ability to regulate
the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... or persons or things
in commerce."'154 The first statute, 18 U.S.C. § 32, regulates the
destruction of aircraft employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce. 155 This statute, like the ICC order discussed in the
Shreveport Rate Cases, constitutes a regulation of the
"instrumentalities of interstate commerce."'156 The second statute cited
in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 659, regulates thefts from interstate
shipments. 57 This statute represents a regulation of a "person or
thing in commerce." 158
C. Ring Three: Regulation of Activities That Substantially Affect
Commerce
The final category of activity that Congress may regulate is
"activit[y] that substantially affect[s] interstate commerce."'159 To
illustrate this category, the Lopez Court cited Wickard v. Filburn.160 In
Wickard, a farmer challenged the constitutionality of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to set a
national acreage allotment for the production of wheat. 161 Under this
scheme, the Secretary of Agriculture indirectly controlled the amount
of wheat that could be produced on each individual farm in the
country.162 The statute limited not only the amount of wheat that each
farm could sell in interstate commerce, but also controlled the amount
of wheat that was raised for home consumption. 163 The Act was
designed to "control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and
foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the
consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to
commerce."164
153. Id.
154. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 559.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
161. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113, 115.
162. Id. at 115.
163. Id. at 118-119.
164. Id. at 115.
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The petitioner, a farmer who had been fined for excess wheat
production, argued that this regulation was unconstitutional because
it regulated the "production and consumption of wheat. ' 165 He
asserted that these activities were beyond Congress's commerce power
because they were "local in character" and their effects upon interstate
commerce were at most "indirect."166 These distinctions were not
dispositive, however, because the Court held that "even if appellee's
activity [is] local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 167
The Court also explained that "home-grown wheat...
constitutes the most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat
crop,"'168 and that it "supplies a need of the man who grew it which
would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market."169
Therefore, the Court concluded that "[i]t can hardly be denied that a
factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions."'170
Finally, the Court explained that Congress could regulate the
amount of wheat that the petitioner produced for home consumption,
even if it could not prove that the petitioner's individual contribution
to the wheat supply substantially affected interstate commerce.1 71 The
Court held that though "appellee's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself, [this] is not enough to remove him from
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial."172 Thus, the Court recognized that Congress could regulate
"not only acts which taken alone would have substantial effects on
interstate commerce, but also acts which might reasonably be deemed
nationally significant in their aggregate economic effect.1 73
Professor Laurence Tribe has observed that the "substantial
effects test" and "aggregation principle" delineated in Wickard and its
progeny represented an "enormous increase" in Congress's commerce
power. 74 He explained that "the interconnectedness of our society and
165. Id. at 119.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 125.
168. Id. at 127.
169. Id. at 128.
170. Id. at 128.
171. Id. at 127-28.
172. Id.
173. See TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-4, at 813 (describing the holding of Wickard).
174. Id. § 5-4, at 814.
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the fact that every act has 'economic consequences combine to suggest
that, with respect to almost any activity, one could make a strong
argument that its repetition all over the country will substantially
affect commerce.' "175
Congress's ability to regulate commerce under these two tests
was increased even further in the 1940s, when the Supreme Court
began "deferring to Congress's findings regarding the effect that a
regulated activity in fact had on interstate commerce." 176 These
doctrinal trends, taken together, meant that the Court would uphold
any federal statute, as long as Congress had a rational basis for
believing that the regulated activity, in the aggregate, had a
"substantial effect" on commerce. 177 Striking down a congressional
attempt to invoke the commerce power became a "de facto
impossibility."1 7 8
In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez,1 79 the Supreme
Court recognized the need to place "judicially cognizable limits to the
increasingly amorphous and seemingly unbounded 'substantial effects'
test."180 The statute at issue in Lopez, the Gun Free School Zones Act,
175. Id. § 5-4, at 823 (" 'In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an
ultimate commercial origin or consequence .... ) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is important to note that until 1971, the Supreme Court
did not apply the "substantial effect" test or the "aggregation principle" in the context of criminal
cases. See Chippendale, supra note 39, at 460. Instead, the Court required all offenses prosecuted
under the Commerce Clause statutes to have an interstate nexus. Id. Then, in the landmark case
of Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), "the Court upheld a conviction under a federal
loan shark statute without any showing of a specific interstate nexus because Congress
determined that extortionate credit transactions in the aggregate affect interstate commerce."
Id. at 460-61. From that point forward, the Court would uphold a federal criminal statute as long
as Congress had a rational basis to believe that the regulated conduct, in the aggregate, had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 461.
176. See TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-4, at 814.
177. See id. § 5-4, at 814-15 (observing that "Congress, seizing the opportunity created by the
Court's 'substantial effect' and 'cumulative effect' principles and by its deference to congressional
findings, relied in part on these doctrines as its constitutional justification for all sorts of
legislation, including civil rights legislation, certain criminal statutes, and food and drug laws").
178. See id. § 5-4, at 816.
Where Congress had provided findings linking the challenged regulation of an activity
to its power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court would defer to these findings
unless they had no "rational basis"; if no findings accompanied the legislation, the
Court demonstrated that it would nevertheless uphold the regulation if it could on its
own imagine the articulation of some rational basis for locating the legislative act
within the commerce power ... and such a rational basis would exist whenever the
requisite effect on interstate commerce could be thought to result from the
aggregation of all instances of an activity .... While all of these precepts were
operating at full tilt, striking down a congressional attempt to invoke the commerce
power ... was a de facto impossibility.
Id.
179. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
180. TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-4, at 818.
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made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause
to believe, is a school zone."''1 The Court noted at the outset of its
analysis that the Gun Free School Zones Act fell within the third
broad category of Commerce Clause regulations, because it could not
fairly be characterized as a regulation of the "channels or
instrumentalities" of interstate commerce.' 8 2
The Court then clarified, and slightly modified, the rule
regarding regulations in the third category: "Where economic activity
substantially affects commerce, legislation regulating that activity will
be sustained."'1 3 In doing so, the Court made it clear that Congress
may not regulate an activity that merely "affects" or has a "trivial
impact" on commerce; rather, Congress must demonstrate a
"substantial effect" on commerce.18 4 More importantly, the Court
delineated a dichotomy18 5 that limited the application of the
substantial effects test and the aggregation principle.'8 6 The Court
restricted these tests by stating that individual instances of a
regulated intrastate activity could not be aggregated to find a
substantial effect on interstate commerce unless that activity could be
classified as "commercial" or "economic."'18 7
Applying this modified constitutional standard, the Court
explained that the Gun Free School Zones Act was "a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of
economic enterprise."'' 88 Consequently, the Court concluded that the
statute could not be upheld "under our cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
181. 514 U.S. at 551 (1995) (citing the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922
(2000)).
182. Id. at 559.
183. Id. at 560.
184. Id. at 559.
185. See TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-4, at 822 (concluding that the Lopez Court settled on a
"comprehensible and ... defensible dichotomy between regulating, for whatever purpose, activity
that is in any sense economic or commercial in nature, and regulating activity that plainly is
not").
186. See id. § 5-4, at 819 (recognizing that Lopez "reaffirmed [the Court's] decisions
upholding federal laws regulating such intrastate activities as coal mining, loan sharking,
running a restaurant, running a hotel, and producing wheat for home consumption" but
explaining that the decision's "key move" was its post hoc "characterization of these prior cases
as involving 'intrastate economic activity,'" even though those decisions did not originally rely on
the commercial nature of the activity being regulated).
187. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
188. Id. at 561.
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transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce."'18 9
The Lopez Court also noted two other features of the Gun Free
School Zones Act that required its invalidation. First, it contained no
jurisdictional nexus that "would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce." 190 Second, the Court noted that "neither the statute, nor
its legislative history contain express congressional findings regarding
the effecte upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school
zone." 19' Thus, the Court invalidated the Gun Free School Zones Act
on the ground that Congress exceeded the scope of its commerce
power.
The next step in the Court's efforts to curb the sweeping
"substantial effects" test took place in United States v. Morrison.192
The statute at issue in Morrison, the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"), provided that "persons within the United States shall have
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."' 93 To
enforce this right, the VAWA provided that "a person ... who commits
a crime of violence ... and thus deprives another of the
[aforementioned right] ... shall be liable to the party injured" in a
civil suit.194
The Court began its analysis by explaining that the VAWA fell
within the third category of Commerce Clause regulation because it
"focus[ed] on gender-motivated violence wherever it occurs (rather
than violence directed at the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
interstate markets, or things or persons in interstate commerce)."' 95
The Court then observed that "since Lopez most recently canvassed
and clarified our case law governing this third category of Commerce
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 562. Although the statute's legislative history did not demonstrate that gun
possession in school zones had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the government
prosecutors advanced numerous arguments at trial that supported this proposition. Id. at 563-
64. Namely, the prosecution argued that "the possession of handguns near schools may lead to
violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the economy in
two ways." Id. at 563. First, "the costs of violent crime are substantial, and through the
mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread through the population." Id. at 563-64. Second,
"violent crime reduces the willingness of people to travel to areas within the country that are
perceived to be unsafe." Id. at 564. The Court concluded, however, that if these arguments were
accepted it would be "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where states have historically been sovereign." Id. at 564.
192. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2000).
194. § 13981(c).
195. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
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Clause regulation, it provides the proper framework for conducting the
required analysis of [VAWA]."196
The Court observed two similarities between the VAWA and
the Gun Free School Zones Act that required the VAWA's
invalidation. 197 First, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not,
in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."'198 The Court noted that
"while we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity ... thus far in our Nation's history
our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature."'199 Second, the
Court observed that the VAWA "contains no jurisdictional element,"200
even though "Lopez [made it] clear that such a jurisdictional element
would lend support to the argument that [the VAWA] is sufficiently
tied to interstate commerce." 201 Instead, "Congress elected to cast
[VAWA's] remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of
violent crime."20 2
The VAWA did, however, have one saving grace. Unlike the
Gun Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, the VAWA's legislative
history contained extensive findings regarding the effects of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce. 20 3 The House and Senate
Reports were replete with evidence that gender-motivated violence
affected interstate commerce by "deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate
business," and by "diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and demand for
interstate products. 20 4
The Court summarily rejected these congressional findings,
however, because they "rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that
we have already rejected [in Lopez] as unworkable if we are to
maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers."20 5 The Court
stated that Congress's highly attenuated "but-for" causal chain would
allow it to regulate "any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
196. Id.
197. Id. at 610-13.
198. Id. at 613.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 614.
204. Id. at 615 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54
(1993)).
205. Id.
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production, transit, or consumption."206 Finally, the Court concluded
that it was for the judiciary, and not the legislature, to determine
whether an activity's effect on interstate commerce was substantial
enough to warrant congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause.20 7 Thus, the Morrison holding reversed the Court's tradition of
unquestioning deference to congressional findings. 208
V. TAMING THE THREE-RING CIRCUS
Unlike the Gun Free School Zones Act and the Violence
Against Women Act, the murder-for-hire statute contains an express
jurisdictional element. 20 9 The purpose of this jurisdictional element is
to ensure that the "trier of fact ... find[s] some sort of connection or
link to interstate commerce as a precondition of [the] statute's
applicability to the case at hand."210 On its face, therefore, § 1958
seems to pose no threat to the delicate balance between state and
federal criminal jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, statutes that contain an express jurisdictional
element may threaten constitutional concepts of federalism when
applied to purely local conduct. Section 1958, as applied to the facts of
Marek and Weathers, is a perfect example. As explained earlier, Marek
suggests that federal jurisdiction under § 1958 is proper so long as the
defendant uses Western Union, a cellular phone, a paging device, an
automobile, an airplane, a telephone, or the Internet in furtherance of
the murder-for-hire scheme. 21' Weathers, while somewhat less
206. Id.
207. Id. at 614 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273
(1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
208. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.2, at 36 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (noting that five Justices, beginning
in the early 1990s and the early twenty-first century, "took the position that the Court would not
defer to Congress concerning the question of whether a single-state noncommercial activity had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce").
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000). Neither the Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922
(2000), nor the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), contained an express
jurisdictional element. Rather, these statutes attempted to regulate a wider and more purely
intrastate body of activity. Section 1958(a), on the other hand, does contain an express
jurisdictional element.
210. TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-5, at 829.
211. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2001). The Marek decision
concluded, without discussion, that Western Union was a "quintessential facility of interstate
commerce." Id. at 320. Section 1958(b) indicates that "facility of interstate commerce" includes
"all means of transportation and communication." Presumably, the court concluded that Western
Union fit within this definition because it is capable of transmitting money across state borders.
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the Marek court would include cellular phones,
pagers, and Internet communications within the same definition.
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troublesome than Marek, suggests that § 1958 should apply in all the
same circumstances provided that the prosecution can prove that the
defendant's use of an electronic communication device caused even a
tenuous, incidental interstate contact. 212 If this same logic were
extended to other federal criminal statutes, it is difficult to perceive
any limitations on the federal government's power.
In essence, Marek and Weathers have interpreted § 1958's
jurisdictional element in a manner that emasculates it of any real
substance or meaning. In that regard, § 1958 engenders grave
constitutional concerns, similar to the Gun Free School Zones Act and
the Violence Against Women Act. Thus, it seems that § 1958 should be
subject to the careful constitutional review advocated by the Supreme
Court in Lopez and Morrison. The following sections will demonstrate,
however, that Lopez and Morrison fail to impose any judicially
cognizable limits on many types of commerce-based federal statutes,
including § 1958.
A. Two Rings of the Three-Ring Circus Remain Untamed: No Limits
on Congress's Power to Regulate the Channels and Instrumentalities of
Interstate Commerce
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court suggested that it
was unwilling to "convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
states." 213 The Court recognized that the substantial effects test and
the aggregation principle, coupled with the Court's tradition of
deference to congressional findings, vested Congress with a license to
regulate virtually all spheres of private conduct. 214 Accordingly, the
Court attempted to formulate judicially cognizable limits on
Congress's commerce power. These limits, the Court explained, would
prevent Congress from regulating noncommercial activities that did
not have a concrete effect on interstate commerce. 215
The decisions in Weathers and Marek demonstrate, however,
that the judicially cognizable limits recognized in Lopez and Morrison
are inadequate to prevent Congress's growing commerce power from
eroding state police power. In Weathers and Marek, the courts of
212. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
213. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
214. See supra Part W.C.
215. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (explaining that the Gun Free School Zones Act was
unconstitutional because "the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity ... and there is no requirement that [the] possession of the firearm have any
concrete tie to interstate commerce").
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appeals had little trouble concluding that Congress had the
constitutional authority to regulate local street crime that had
traditionally been the subject of state criminal law. In neither case did
the court ask whether the regulated activity, murder-for-hire schemes,
could be considered commercial or economic. In neither case did the
courts ask whether the regulated activity, through repetition
elsewhere, could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In
neither case did the court find it necessary to consult the statute's
legislative history to determine whether murder-for-hire schemes had
a significant connection to the national economy. Instead, both cases
were resolved largely as a matter of statutory interpretation. The
courts did not ask whether Congress had constitutional authority to
regulate local murder-for-hire schemes. Rather, they asked whether
Congress intended for the murder-for-hire-statute to apply to the facts
of this case.
This analysis does not imply, however, that the Marek and
Weathers courts failed to employ the proper constitutional standards
when analyzing § 1958. Rather, these cases illustrate two significant
limitations on the holdings in Lopez and Morrison. First, Lopez and
Morrison left untouched Congress's ability to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce. 216 Indeed, the holdings in
Lopez and Morrison only limited Congress's ability to regulate
activities that substantially affect commerce. In other words, the
Supreme Court placed limits on the third Lopez category, but did not
place any limits on the first two categories. As explained in Part III.D,
the primary constitutional restraint formulated by Lopez and
Morrison was to limit the substantial effects test and the aggregation
principle. Shortly after Lopez was decided, the Court made it clear
that these constitutional restraints do not affect Congress's authority
to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce, that is,
regulations falling within the first two categories of Lopez.217
216. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 208, § 4.2, at 41 (explaining that, after Lopez and
Morrison, the Court will continue to uphold federal laws that regulate the channels of interstate
commerce or that regulate activities, persons, products, or transactions that cross state or
national borders); TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-5, at 825-33 (explaining that the Lopez decision left
"untouched" Congress's ability to regulate the "channels" and "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce; of persons and objects participating in interstate commerce; and of activities
jurisdictionally "connected" to interstate commerce).
217. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 208, § 4.2, at 36 (using the Supreme Court case of
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), to explain that it is unnecessary to consider whether a
regulated activity substantially affects commerce when the regulation falls within the first or
second Lopez category); George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate:
Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 1016-17 (2001) (explaining that, even
308 [Vol. 56:277
ELECTRONIC IMPULSES
The Court subsequently confirmed the limited nature of Lopez
and Morrison, holding in United States v. Robertson that the
substantial effects test and the aggregation principle applied only
when Congress attempted to regulate intrastate activity that allegedly
had a substantial effect on commerce. 218 In other words, the
substantial effects test and aggregation principle apply only when
Congress is attempting to regulate within the third category.
21 9
Professor Tribe has suggested that the substantial effects test is not
relevant outside the third category because, "the first two categories,
by definition, substantially affect [commerce] -because they are
components of-interstate commerce."220
The second limitation of Lopez and Morrison is that they seem
to leave "untouched ... federal statutes that contain a jurisdictional
element expressly requiring the trier of fact to find some sort of
connection or link to interstate commerce as a precondition of a given
statute's applicability to the case at hand."221 The Lopez decision
seems to suggest that such statutes, by their very terms, would only
apply in cases where the defendant had utilized a facility or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or engaged in activity that
"substantially affected commerce."222 In other words, the Court
concluded that jurisdictional elements serve as independent judicial
checks and ensure that the statute applies only when the regulated
activity falls into one of three preexisting Lopez categories.
after Lopez and Morrison, Congress's power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce appears to extend to noneconomic activity).
218. See TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-5, at 826-27 (citing United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S.
669, 671 (1995)).
219. See id.
220. Id. § 5-5, at 827.
221. Id. § 5-5, at 829. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court relied on numerous factors in
deciding to invalidate the Gun Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act,
respectively. See supra Part IV.C. Among the factors considered was that each statute lacked a
jurisdictional element that would ensure that the regulated activity was sufficiently connected to
interstate commerce. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). The Court further implied that, if such an element had been
present in the relevant statutes, both Lopez and Morrison might have been decided differently.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that "Lopez makes clear that such a jurisdictional element
would lend support to the argument that [the regulated activity] is sufficiently tied to
commerce"). But see ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 208, at 43 ("[The Morrison opinion] noted
that the Act contained no 'jurisdictional element,' but ... also stated that such a statement
would not have been enough in itself to save the statute.").
222. See TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-5, at 829-30 n.19 (explaining that Lopez seems to treat
statutes containing a jurisdictional element "as falling within the third category ... inasmuch as
the Court says it will treat the jurisdictional hook as itself satisfying the requirement of
substantial effect").
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Justice Breyer's dissent in Morrison criticized the majority's
apparent endorsement of statutes with a jurisdictional element.22 3 For
example, Breyer explained that Congress might be encouraged to
insert a jurisdictional element into statutes whose constitutional
validity was questionable.224 He keenly observed that the addition of a
jurisdictional element would do little, if anything, to address the
Court's federalism concerns since "most everyday products or their
component parts cross interstate boundaries. '" 225 Nonetheless, this
small textual change would presumably remove the statute from the
Court's heightened constitutional scrutiny.22 6
The limitations of the Lopez holding help to explain why Marek
and Weathers were resolved largely as matters of statutory
interpretation. First, both courts were distinctly aware that the text of
§ 1958 contained an express jurisdictional element. 227  Second,
223. See Brown, supra note 217, at 1012 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 659 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
224. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 659.
225. Id.; see also Glenn H. Reynolds, Lower Courts Reading of Lopez, or What if the Supreme
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 369, 388 n.100
(explaining that "[a] hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element [guarantees
constitutionality] ignores the fact that ... the jurisdictional hook may be so attenuated as to fail
to guarantee that the activity regulated has a substantial effect on interstate commerce").
226. Although the Court demonstrated a "strong receptivity towards statutes containing a
jurisdictional element" in Lopez and Morrison, the Justices might be changing their attitude. See
Brown, supra note 217, at 1010. In a unanimous decision, the Court implied that "the concerns
brought to the fore in Lopez" may also be present in cases involving the application of federal
statutes with jurisdictional elements. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858
(2000)).
In Jones, the defendant set fire to a private dwelling using a Molotov cocktail. Jones, 529
U.S. at 851. He was convicted under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000), which
makes it a federal crime to damage or destroy "by means of fire or an explosive, any... property
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate of foreign
commerce." Id. at 850. The prosecution argued that the jurisdictional element was satisfied
because the residence was "used" to secure a mortgage from an out-of-state lender and also
because it received its natural gas from a source outside Indiana. Id. at 854. The Court resolved
the case as a matter of statutory construction, holding that these "passive, passing, [and] past
connection~s] to commerce" were not enough, because the jurisdictional element "is most sensibly
read to mean active employment for a commercial purpose .... " Id. at 855-56.
The Court took the opinion one step further, however, by addressing the underlying
constitutional concerns. Id. at 857-58. It explained that, "[g]iven the concerns brought to the fore
in Lopez, it is appropriate to avoid the constitutional question that would arise were we to read
[the statute] to render [Jones'] 'traditionally local criminal conduct' ... 'a matter for federal
enforcement.' " Id. at 858. The Court cited Lopez for the proposition that it would avoid any
statutory construction that would raise "grave and doubtful constitutional questions" by allowing
Congress to regulate areas of "traditional state concern." Id. at 857-58. This portion of the
opinion suggests that the heightened constitutional standard of Lopez and Morrison may be
brought to bear on statutes containing express jurisdictional elements.
227. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 315-16 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Weathers and Marek concluded that § 1958 fell within the first and
second Lopez categories, respectively. 228 Either one of these factors, by
itself, would have been sufficient to remove § 1958 from the
heightened constitutional standard of Lopez and Morrison.229
In that light, it is not surprising that the courts in Marek and
Weathers found § 1958 to be constitutional, even as applied to purely
local criminal conduct. After all, the Supreme Court had invalidated
only two federal statutes in six decades. Neither of those statutes
contained a jurisdictional hook, nor did they fall within one of the first
two Lopez categories. It is evident that the Supreme Court's three-
category framework has numerous loopholes that permit further
expansion of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
B. Two Rings of the Three-Ring Circus Remain Largely Undefined: No
Guidance Regarding the Scope of the Three Rings
The Marek and Weathers decisions illustrate one additional
deficiency of the Lopez and Morrison holdings: the Supreme Court has
failed to adequately define the phrases "channels of interstate
commerce" and "instrumentality of interstate commerce." It is not
entirely clear whether these categories are subject to limitations or
whether they merely serve as default categories for all federal statutes
that cannot neatly be classified as regulations of intrastate activities
that substantially affect commerce. As demonstrated in Part IV.A, this
classification has important constitutional implications. Statutes
falling within the first two categories are not subject to the heightened
constitutional review of Lopez and Morrison and are therefore likely to
receive rubber-stamp judicial approval under the highly deferential
rational basis test.
The Supreme Court has never promulgated a concrete
definition for the phrase "channels of commerce." As explained in Part
III.A, the Court attempted to illustrate the meaning of this phrase by
citing United States v. Darby230 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States.231 In Darby, the Court affirmed Congress's power to
prohibit the shipment of goods that had been produced in violation of
228. Marek, 238 F.3d at 317 (explaining that "[w]hen it adopted § 1958, Congress was acting
within the second of three broad categories identified ... in United States v. Lopez," i.e., the
power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Weathers, 169 F.3d at 342
(concluding that the phrase "facility in interstate commerce" was the controlling wording of
§ 1958 and it "is best interpreted as Congress's attempt to regulate the use of the channel of
interstate commerce," i.e., the first Lopez category).
229. See supra Part IV.A.
230. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
231. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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minimum wage and maximum hour laws.2 3 2 By giving Congress the
power to prohibit the physical shipment of goods, the holding in Darby
suggested that the phrase "channels of interstate commerce" includes
the United States Postal Service, railways, highways, and other
similar routes of interstate transportation and shipment. 233 These
conduits of transportation comport with the common sense
understanding of channels of commerce.
The Court left room for the expansion of the scope of the phrase
"channels of interstate commerce," however, when it cited Heart of
Atlanta.23 4 The reference to Heart of Atlanta suggests that the phrase
"channels of interstate commerce" permits Congress to regulate
stationary facilities such as hotels, restaurants, gas stations,
automobile repair facilities, rest stops, camping grounds, and parking
lots. The decision in Heart of Atlanta thus suggests that the phrase
"channels of interstate commerce" includes items that are only
incidentally related to the actual "river of commerce. 235
By failing to provide a concrete definition for channels of
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court gave lower courts wide
latitude to interpret the phrase broadly. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Weathers court indirectly concluded that a cellular telephone
is a "channel of interstate commerce." 236 Nonetheless, common sense
suggests that a cellular phone is hardly synonymous with railways,
highways, hotels, or any other components of the river of commerce.
Not only did the Court fail to clearly define the phrase "channel
of interstate commerce," it also failed to provide a concrete definition
of the phrase "instrumentality of interstate commerce." Rather than
formulating a clear definition, the Supreme Court attempted to
illustrate the meaning of the phrase "instrumentality of interstate
commerce" by citing three cases: the Shreveport Rate Cases, 237
232. See discussion infra Part III.
233. Professor Tribe has colorfully described these transportation facilities as the "rivers of
commerce." See TRIBE, supra note 147, § 5-5, at 827.
234. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S.
at 256 ).
235. The companion case to Heart of Atlanta, Katzenbach v. McClung ("Ollie's Barbecue'),
which was not cited by the Lopez court, hinted at an even more expansive interpretation, since
the restaurant in that case had apparently never served any interstate travelers. See
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
236. The Weathers court concluded that a cellular phone, which necessarily emits interstate
electronic signals, constitutes a "facility in interstate commerce." United States v. Weathers, 169
F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999). It then concluded that the phrase "facility in interstate commerce"
is best interpreted as Congress's attempt to regulate the "use of the channels of interstate
commerce." Id. at 342. Thus, it indirectly concluded that a cellular phone is a channel of
interstate commerce.
237. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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Southern Railroad Co. v. United States,238  and United States v.
Perez.239 The Court in the Shreveport Rate Cases and Southern
Railroad held that Congress was permitted to regulate railroads that
provide interstate shipping services.240 In Perez, the Court explained
that Congress could regulate the destruction of aircraft employed in
interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce. 241 These cases, taken
together, suggest that the phrase "instrumentality of interstate
commerce" should include commercial vehicles that facilitate the
interstate shipment and transportation of goods and people through
the channels of commerce. 242 But the Court's failure to be more precise
retained the possibility that the lower courts would adopt a more
expansive view.
The lower courts have taken full advantage of this opportunity.
Consequently, the phrase "instrumentality of interstate commerce"
has evolved in the lower federal courts and now includes
automobiles, 243  cellular telephones, 244  the United States Postal
Service, 245  conventional telephones, 246  and automated teller
machines. 247 Common sense suggests that these items are not
analogous to railroads, airplanes, or other commercial vehicles that
facilitate interstate shipment and transportation through the
channels of commerce.
238. 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
239. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
240. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of these cases.
241. 402 U.S. at 150.
242. It seems that at least one federal judge offers support for this definition of the
"instrumentalities of interstate commerce." See Reynolds, supra note 225, at 384 n.79 ("Category
Two, in the opinion of Judge Higginbotham, 'encompassed only vehicles that move or could move
in interstate commerce and people or goods traveling in interstate commerce.' ") (citing United
States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)).
243. See United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 319 (2001) (explaining that automobiles have
been considered "facilities of interstate commerce," i.e., instrumentalities of interstate commerce)
(citing United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 589 (3d Cir. 1995)).
244. See United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
cellular phones, even when used intrastate, have been held to be instrumentalities of interstate
commerce) (citing United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997)).
245. Marek, 238 F.3d at 317 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the United
States Postal Service is a "facility in interstate commerce," i.e., an "instrumentality of interstate
commerce") (citing United States v. Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1994)).
246. See, e.g., Weathers, 169 F.3d at 341; United States v. Graham, 856 F.2d 756, 760-61 (6th
Cir. 1988); Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 503 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1974); FTC v.
Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1980) (all holding that telephones, even when used intrastate,
are instrumentalities of interstate commerce).
247. Marek, 238 F.3d at 319 (citing United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the court in Baker held that an interstate network of automated teller machines
constituted a "facility in interstate commerce," or rather, "an instrumentality of interstate
commerce")).
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By slowly expanding the scope of the phrases "channels of
interstate commerce" and "instrumentalities of interstate commerce,"
the federal courts have created a loophole that allows Congress to
further federalize criminal law. Theoretically, Congress could regulate
most garden-variety street crimes by drafting statutes that apply only
if the putative defendant used a cellular phone, paging device, ATM
machine, or Internet transmission in furtherance of the crime.
Congress could then allege that these statutes were designed to
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce from immoral
uses. In effect, this technique would allow Congress to regulate
noneconomic, intrastate criminal activity that has no demonstrated
effect on interstate commerce. These statutes might be upheld because
they would be exempt from the Court's heightened constitutional
standard applied in Lopez and Morrison.
C. The Solution: Is It Better to Combine Lopez's Three Rings or to Add
a Fourth?
Part IV.A and IV.B of this Note illustrate two deficiencies of
the Supreme Court's current Commerce Clause jurisprudence. First,
federal statutes are exempt from constitutional review if they contain
an express jurisdictional element. 248 Second, commerce-based statutes
will be exempt from heightened constitutional review if they are
deemed regulations of the instrumentalities or channels of interstate
commerce. 249 Thus, the Court has created an incentive for Congress to
exploit these loopholes to ensure that its commerce-based statutes
receive rubber-stamp constitutional approval.
In light of these limitations, it is evident that despite the
intentions of the Lopez Court, the Supreme Court's current Commerce
Clause jurisprudence cannot prevent Congress from converting its
commerce power into "a general police power of the sort retained by
the states."250 This section of the Note proposes two new Commerce
Clause standards that are designed to achieve the federalist objectives
of Lopez more effectively than did Lopez itself.
248. See supra Part W.A.
249. See supra Part W.A.
250. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
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1. Extending the Reach of Lopez and Morrison by Eliminating the
Three-Category Framework
One way to close the loopholes in the Court's current
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to eliminate the three-category
framework and extend the heightened standard of review formulated
in Lopez and Morrison to all commerce-based statutes. 251 Under this
uniform standard, Congress would be permitted to regulate
economic 252 activities that, in the aggregate, 253 have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. In addition, Congress could regulate
251. Professors Nelson and Pushaw have formulated a revised Commerce Clause standard
that (i) eliminates Lopez's three-category framework and (ii) adopts a uniform constitutional
standard for all commerce-based statutes. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 107-63. While
there are a number of similarities between the NelsonlPushaw standard and my proposed
standard, there are also a number of important differences. See infra notes 252-54. Generally
speaking, the NelsonlPushaw standard represents a more drastic departure from the Court's
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence than my proposed standard. See supra notes 250-52.
252. The new constitutional standard formulated by Professors Pushaw and Nelson would
permit Congress to (1) "regulate 'commerce' (2) that implicates more than one state." Nelson &
Pushaw, supra note 45, at 107. The professors intentionally eschew the term "economics" in favor
of the term "commerce." In their view, the term "commerce" includes only "the voluntary
exchange of goods or property or services and all accompanying market-oriented activities,
enterprises, relationships, and interests"; while the term "economics" covers virtually all human
endeavors and interactions, including areas such as crime and religion." Id. at 107-09. I believe
that Nelson and Pushaw have misconstrued the judicial understanding of the term "economic."
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that they do not construe the word "economic"
to include criminal activity. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (explaining
that "[g]ender-motivated crimes [proscribed by the Violence Against Women Act] are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity") (emphasis added); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (explaining
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise") (emphasis added). Because I believe that
Pushaw and Nelson's concerns are misguided, my proposed standard retains the
"economic/noneconomic" distinction applied in Lopez and Morrison.
253. Nelson and Pushaw's standard seems to abandon the requirement that a regulated
activity have a "substantial effect on interstate commerce." Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at
107. Accordingly, their standard also abandons the "aggregation principle" formulated in
Wickard and its progeny. Instead, they require only that the regulated activity "[implicate]
commerce in more than one state." Id. They admit that "our second hurdle is usually easy to
clear because almost all interstate commerce has interstate effects." Id. at 159. In fact, after
Nelson and Pushaw apply their proposed constitutional standard to a number of hypothetical
fact patterns, they concede that "[o]ur analysis thus far has not identified a single federal statute
that fails to meet our second requirement." Id. at 158. They suggest, however, that the second
prong of their test would prevent Congress from regulating "local, ad hoc commercial
transactions" such as lemonade stands and garage sales. Id. at 158-59. I believe that the second
prong of the Nelson/Pushaw standard has no real bite. It would not prohibit Congress from
regulating local activity that causes tenuous or incidental interstate contacts. Consequently, I
chose to retain the Supreme Court's current requirement that the regulated activity
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. Since I retained the requirement, I also retained the
"aggregation principle," which permits Congress to aggregate individual violations to prove that
a regulated activity has a "substantial effect" on commerce.
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noneconomic activities, 254 but only if it could prove that individual
instances of the regulated activity have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
It is important to note three important differences between this
proposed constitutional standard and the Court's existing three-
category framework. First, Congress would always be required to
demonstrate that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Under the Court's existing jurisprudence,
Congress is not required to prove that the regulated activity
substantially affects commerce if it is regulating a "channel" or
"instrumentality" of commerce. 255 Second, a federal statute would be
subject to the heightened standard of constitutional review even if it
contained an express jurisdictional element. Under the Court's
existing jurisprudence, these statutes arguably escape the Court's
heightened constitutional review. 256 Third, this proposed standard
would prohibit Congress from using the aggregation principle when
attempting to regulate noneconomic activity. This standard differs
from the Court's existing jurisprudence, which limits the aggregation
principle to the third Lopez category under which Congress may
regulate an activity that substantially affects commerce. 257
A simple example illustrates the differences between this
proposed standard and the Court's existing three-category framework.
Suppose, for example, that a man travels from his Manhattan
apartment to his girlfriend's apartment in Newark, New Jersey
intending to assault her. Suppose further that he is indicted under the
federal domestic violence statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, which imposes
criminal sanctions on anyone "who travels in interstate or foreign
commerce ... with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse
or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such
travel, commits or attempts to commit a crime of violence." 258
254. Nelson and Pushaw's proposed constitutional standard does not usually permit
Congress to regulate noncommercial activities, even if Congress could demonstrate that those
activities substantially affect commerce. Under their standard, noneconomic crimes and torts can
be regulated only when they interfere with or threaten commerce itself. Id. at 107.
255. See supra Part [V.A.
256. See supra Part [V.A.
257. See supra Part [V.A.
258. Professors Nelson and Pushaw applied their proposed constitutional standard to a
number of existing federal statutes to demonstrate its effect on Congress's existing commerce-
based legislation. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 147-59. The examples are also used to
demonstrate the simplicity and effectiveness of their standard. I follow a similar approach
throughout Part IV.C.1 of this Note. I am indebted to Professors Nelson and Pushaw for their
guidance in this regard.
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Under the existing three-category framework, federal courts
would resolve the case largely as a matter of statutory interpretation.
The sole question for the courts would be whether Congress intended §
2261 to proscribe the conduct in the instant case. The Court would pay
scant attention, however, to the underlying constitutionality of the
statute. The statute would be exempt from the Court's heightened
standard of constitutional review for two reasons.259 First, the statute
probably would fall within the first Lopez category, because it
represents an attempt by Congress to protect the channels of
interstate commerce from immoral uses. Second, the statute contains
an express jurisdictional element that, at least theoretically, requires
the trier of fact to find a nexus with interstate commerce.
Therefore, the prosecution would not be required to show that
the proscribed conduct has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, whether individually or in the aggregate. In addition, the
courts would review the constitutionality of the statute under the
highly deferential rational basis standard of review. Under that
standard, it is very unlikely that the court would dismiss the
indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, even though the
defendant committed a purely local crime. Thus, the federal
government would be permitted to usurp the state's traditional
authority for criminal law enforcement.
Under my proposed standard, however, the result would be
different. First, the prosecution would be required to prove that the
proscribed conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
This burden would be particularly difficult to satisfy, as the
prosecution would be prohibited from using the aggregation principle.
The aggregation principle would be unavailable because § 2261 is a
criminal statute that "by [its] terms has nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms."260 Consequently, the prosecution would be required to
prove that the defendant's individual instance of intrastate violence
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It seems unlikely that
the prosecution could meet this burden, and the courts would
therefore dismiss the defendant's indictment for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
This example illustrates one of the desirable features of this
Note's proposed constitutional standard. It would prohibit Congress
from regulating a number of street crimes, such as carjacking, arson,
259. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the type of statutes exempt from the heightened
constitutional standard applied in Lopez and Morrison.
260. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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murder, possession of handguns, and possession of narcotics for
personal use. 261 None of these criminal offenses can be fairly
characterized as regulations of an economic activity, and,
consequently, Congress would be required to prove that individual
instances of these crimes substantially affect interstate commerce. It
seems highly unlikely that Congress could meet this burden.
Accordingly, federal regulation of these crimes would be deemed
unconstitutional under the new standard.
This new standard is also desirable because it would still
permit Congress to regulate complex white-collar crimes that involve
"an interplay of business, financial, and government institutions,"' 262
sophisticated multistate criminal enterprises, and drug trafficking.
This feature of the test is beneficial because federal jurisdiction is
necessary and proper when state law enforcement officials are unable
to effectively and efficiently investigate and prosecute complex
crimes. 263
A simple example illustrates this point. Imagine that the CEO
of a publicly traded company, acting on the basis of nonpublic
information, sells shares of the company's stock. He thereby gains an
unfair advantage over other stock market participants. Under the new
standard, the federal government would be permitted to prosecute
insider trading, as well as other forms of securities fraud, under Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. These fraudulent schemes are
economic in nature because, by their very terms, they must be
employed "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."264 In
addition, Congress would have little difficulty proving that securities
fraud, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on the national
economy. Therefore, Rule 10b-5 would be deemed constitutional under
the new standard.
Congress would also be permitted to regulate certain types of
organized crime enterprises under the Racketeer Influenced and
261. See supra note 258. Professors Nelson and Pushaw apply their proposed constitutional
standard to many of the crimes mentioned here. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 119-58.
262. See Mengler, supra note 2, at 517-18 (describing the complex nature of white-collar
crime).
263. See Ashdown, supra note 28, at 799-801 (explaining numerous situations in which
federal law enforcement is required and ultimately concluding that "there appear to be two
situations where congressional exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction is clearly warranted-
cases where the states, although capable, are unwilling to engage the machinery of their own
domestic criminal law or when local law enforcement is incapable of handling a problem national
in scope. Civil rights protection and political corruption might be examples of the former, while
protection of national markets and organized crime represent activities in the latter category").
264. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b-5, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd n.5 (2000).
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Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RICO"). 265 RICO prohibits "using
or investing income from a 'pattern of racketeering activity' to acquire
an interest in an enterprise."266 Under RICO, the term "racketeering"
includes a "great variety of serious criminal conduct, including
murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, and drug
dealing."267 Although the crimes included within RICO's definition of
racketeering are normally considered noneconomic, they take on
economic characteristics when the proceeds of these crimes are used to
"acquire an interest in an enterprise."268 Thus, Congress would be able
to regulate racketeering activities that are used to fund corrupt
organizations as long as it could prove that, in the aggregate, these
crimes have a substantial effect on commerce. Once again, Congress
should have little difficulty satisfying this standard.
Finally, Congress would be able to regulate intrastate drug
trafficking as well as the possession and/or manufacture of narcotics
with intent to distribute. 269 These crimes are economic because they
presuppose that narcotics will be distributed in return for money,
goods, or services. Congress could presumably demonstrate that even
intrastate narcotics offenses, taken in the aggregate, have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress would
also be permitted to regulate these crimes under the new standard.
One problematic aspect of the new standard, however, is that
Congress still would be permitted to regulate some garden-variety
street crimes, including murder-for-hire and prostitution. Both of
these crimes are economic in nature because they involve an exchange
of money for a service. Therefore, Congress would be permitted to
regulate prostitution and murder-for-hire as long as it could prove
that, in the aggregate, these crimes have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. It is possible, therefore, that the outcomes of
Marek and Weathers would be the same under the new constitutional
standard.
Although the Marek and Weathers decisions may remain
undisturbed, the new standard would still prevent further
federalization of criminal law. As explained in Part I, Marek and
Weathers are not troublesome merely because they permit Congress to
265. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000); see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 151-52
(applying their proposed constitutional standard to the RICO statute).
266. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 151.
267. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5(d)(3) (3d ed. 2000).
268. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 45, at 151-52.
269. See supra note 252. Professors Nelson and Pushaw apply their proposed constitutional
standard to various federal regulations of controlled substances. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra
note 45, at 136-38.
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regulate murder-for-hire schemes. Rather, Marek and Weathers are
troublesome because, if their reasoning is extended to its logical
conclusion, Congress would have the authority to regulate any garden-
variety crime facilitated by Western Union, a telephone, an
automobile, an airplane, a paging device, or the Internet.
Under the new standard, however, this expansion would not be
possible. Even when a crime is facilitated by an instrumentality or
channel of interstate commerce, such as Western Union or a cellular
telephone, the new standard would require Congress to prove that the
regulated crime substantially affects interstate commerce. If the
regulated crime is noneconomic, as is the case with many garden-
variety crimes, then Congress would be unable to use the aggregation
principle to satisfy this requirement. Therefore, the new standard
would prohibit courts from further federalizing criminal law by
extending the logic used in Marek and Weathers to noneconomic
crimes.
2. Adding a Fourth Category of Activity to the Lopez / Morrison
Framework
Rather than eliminating the three-category framework
delineated in Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court couldadd a
fourth category to the existing framework. The fourth category would
be used to analyze congressional regulations of interstate
communication devices in cases like Marek and Weathers.270 The
fourth category would apply in a variety of cases, including Marek and
Weathers, where the jurisdictional element of a federal criminal
statute is allegedly satisfied by the defendant's intrastate use of a
communication device that causes only a tenuous and incidental
interstate contact.
Under this standard, Congress would be permitted to regulate
interstate communication devices only if the parties to the
communication were located in different states. Under this standard,
the electronic signal path would be completely irrelevant. This
approach was initially developed by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin in
United States v. Paredes.271 In Paredes, Judge Scheindlin explained
that federal criminal jurisdiction would be virtually unlimited if an
"electronic signal path" was sufficient to generate federal jurisdiction.
She aptly noted that:
270. See supra note 6 (providing a definition of the phrase "interstate communication
device").
271. 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Intrastate communications have taken on an interstate quality because of the means by
which beepers, cellular phones, email and telephones function. It is very likely that in
the near future all electronic forms of communication will be transmitted across state
lines regardless of the location of the communicating parties. As the original role of
federal criminal jurisdiction was intended to be limited in nature, it is troubling to
permit technological innovation to significantly expand its scope without a specific
expression of Congressional intent.
27 2
Based on this observation, Judge Scheindlin concluded that federal
jurisdiction should be based on the location of the communicating
parties, rather than on the electronic signal path.273
The effect of this new standard can be illustrated by applying it
to the facts of Marek and Weathers.274 In both cases, the defendants
used an electronic device to facilitate communication with a hit man
located within the same state. 275 In Weathers, the prosecution also
demonstrated that the defendant's electronic communications device
emitted an electronic signal that caused a brief, incidental out-of-state
contact. 27
6
The facts of Marek and Weathers fail to satisfy the requirement
of the proposed fourth Lopez category. That category dictates that
Congress is prohibited from regulating the use of an interstate
communication facility if the communicating parties are located
within the borders of the same state. Therefore, under the proposed
fourth Lopez category, Marek and Weathers would have been
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The foregoing example illustrates two primary advantages of
adding a fourth category to the Lopez framework. First, the new
standard would prevent Congress from regulating local street crimes
that have "taken on an interstate quality because of the means by
which beepers, cellular phones, email and telephones function. '277
Second, the standard is extremely simple. Federal courts would
merely need to inquire whether the communicating parties were
272. Id. at 589. The court in Weathers also discussed the threat that technological innovation
poses to the delicate balance between federal and state authorities. United States v. Weathers,
169 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1999). It explained that ambiguous statutes "will pose even thornier
questions as communications that appear to be carried on intrastate are increasingly
transmitted by satellite and other obviously interstate facilities." Id.
273. Judge Scheindlin thought that this standard was appropriate unless, of course,
Congress expressed a clear intent to regulate murder-for-hire based on the electronic signal path.
See Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 589-90. Unlike Judge Scheindlin, I believe this standard should
apply even if Congress does express an unambiguous intent to regulate murder based upon
tenuous interstate commerce.
274. See supra Sections II.A & II.B for an extensive discussion of Weathers and Marek,
respectively.
275. See supra Sections II.A & II.B.
276. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 339, 342.
277. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 589.
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located in different states at the time of the communication. If so,
federal jurisdiction would be proper. If not, prosecutorial authority
would be delegated to state law enforcement officials who would
presumably be quite capable of investigating and prosecuting the local
criminal scheme.
This new standard is, however, subject to one important
limitation. Specifically, the standard only applies when Congress
attempts to regulate the use of an interstate communication facility.
Consequently, it would not limit Congress's ability to regulate a
variety of other local crime schemes. Consider, for example, the
Manhattan businessman who solicits a prostitute on the streets of
New York. If the man consummated the crime in a Manhattan hotel
room, the state authorities would have the exclusive power to regulate
his conduct. If, however, the businessman sought cheaper hotel rates
across the Hudson River, the federal authorities would have
jurisdiction.278 Indeed, federal law provides criminal sanctions for
those who "knowingly transport any individual in interstate or foreign
commerce... with intent that such individual engage in prostitution,
or in any sexual activity."279 The fourth Lopez category would not
prevent the federal authorities from prosecuting this local crime
scheme. In this instance, the defendant never used an interstate
communication facility in furtherance of the crime. Therefore, the
proposed fourth Lopez category would be inapplicable.
3. The Optimal Solution
In the preceding sections, I have proposed two Commerce
Clause standards that are designed to prevent Congress from
converting its commerce power into a plenary police power of the sort
retained by the states. Ultimately, the optimal solution is for the
Supreme Court to supplement its existing Commerce Clause
framework with a fourth category, which would be narrowly tailored
to address the primary issue raised in this Note. Namely, it would
prevent Congress from further federalizing criminal law in the wake
of technological innovation. Indeed, the four-category framework
would prevent Congress from regulating local crime schemes that
have taken on interstate characteristics merely because the defendant
uses an electronic communication device in furtherance of the crime.
The other proposed standard, which involves eliminating the
three-category framework and creating a uniform Commerce Clause
278. This hypothetical fact pattern was conceived by the late Judge Henry J. Friendly. See
supra note 2.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000).
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test, is not narrowly tailored and would apply to a much broader group
of cases. Indeed, the new standard would apply in all cases where
federal jurisdiction is based on Congress's commerce power. In that
regard, the uniform Commerce Clause standard would represent a
more drastic departure from the Supreme Court's existing Commerce
Clause framework. The federal courts may have difficulty
implementing this new standard, because a great deal of the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence would not have continuing
validity under the new standard.
The four-category Commerce Clause framework is also
preferable because of its simplicity. Under the new test, federal
jurisdiction is proper only if the communicating parties are located in
different states at the time of the communication. This simple fact
question presumably could be resolved by the jury. Thus, the four-
category framework would probably yield consistent, predictable
results in the federal courts. Moreover, federal prosecutors would be
discouraged from initiating a criminal prosecution unless they had
convincing proof that the defendant engaged in an interstate
communication. This prosecutorial reluctance would prevent the
courts from spending time on criminal cases that are likely to be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The uniform Commerce Clause standard is not nearly as
simple as the four-category framework. Under the uniform Commerce
Clause standard, federal courts would be required to determine
whether the regulated criminal activity is economic or noneconomic in
nature. This determination is not always simple, since many garden-
variety crimes, including arson and carjacking, might be motivated by
the prospect of pecuniary gain. Second, the federal courts would be
required to determine whether the regulated activity, alone or in the
aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This
determination requires significant judicial discretion, because, in the
past, the courts have been unable to develop the necessary objective.
Thus, the new standard is not likely to lead to uniform interpretation
in the federal courts.
Due to these practical considerations, the Supreme Court
should adopt the four-category Commerce Clause framework instead
of eliminating the three-category framework and adopting a uniform
standard. This four-category framework is much simpler and is likely
to produce more consistent results in the federal courts.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In two recent cases, Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court
warned that the Commerce Clause "must be considered in light of our
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to...
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is federal and what
is local and create a completely centralized government."280 In
addition, the Court emphasized that it was unwilling to "convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause into a [plenary]
police power of the sort retained by the states. '28 1 The Court
attempted to preserve these federalist ideals by formulating a
heightened standard of constitutional review for certain commerce-
based federal statutes.
More specifically, the Court placed two judicially cognizable
limits on Congress's ability to regulate intrastate activities that affect
commerce, i.e., regulations falling within the third Lopez/Morrison
category. 28 2 First, the Court held that Congress would not be
permitted to regulate within the third category unless it could
demonstrate that an intrastate activity had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 28 3 Second, the Court held that Congress would
not be permitted to use the aggregation principle to prove a
substantial effect on interstate commerce unless the regulated activity
was deemed economic. 28 4
This Note demonstrates, however, that these limits are not
sufficient to achieve the Court's federalist objectives. The Court's
current Commerce Clause jurisprudence contains two significant
loopholes that permit further federal encroachment on the state police
power. First, the constitutional standards announced in Lopez and
Morrison do not restrict Congress's ability to regulate the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce-the first two categories of
the Lopez/Morrison framework. Rather, those cases only limit
Congress's ability to regulate activities that affect commerce-the
third category in the Lopez/Morrison framework. Second, the decisions
in Lopez and Morrison seem to leave untouched federal statutes that
contain an express jurisdictional element. The statutes in Lopez and
280. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin
Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995) (quoting NLRB,
301 U.S. at 37).
281. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
282. See supra Sections IIlA-C for a detailed discussion of the three-category framework
developed in Lopez and Morrison.
283. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
284. Id.
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Morrison may have been subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny
only because they lacked such a jurisdictional element. 285
Two recent court of appeals cases, Marek and Weathers,
illustrate the grave and questionable consequences of the loopholes in
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In both cases,
the courts were asked to interpret the jurisdictional requirements of §
1958. That statute had two important characteristics: (i) it contained
an express jurisdictional element, and (ii) it represented a
congressional regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. For both of these reasons, the statute was
exempt from the judicially cognizable limitations announced in Lopez.
The cases were decided largely as a matter of statutory interpretation,
with little attention given to the underlying constitutional
consequences. 28 6
Due to the lack of meaningful constitutional review, the Marek
and Weathers courts reached troubling conclusions. In Marek, the
court implicitly concluded that the federal government should have
the power to investigate and prosecute all crimes that are facilitated
by an automobile, an airplane, a cellular telephone, a paging device, or
the Internet.28 7 Under the interpretation in Marek, the prosecution
was not required to prove that the use of these facilities caused an
actual interstate contact. 288 The Weathers opinion, while somewhat
less troublesome than Marek, implicitly suggested that the federal
government should have jurisdiction over all of the same crimes, as
long as the prosecution can prove that the defendant's use of a "facility
of interstate commerce" causes even a tenuous and incidental
interstate contact. 28 9
In essence, the Marek and Weathers threaten to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause into a plenary
police power, even though the Court in Lopez and Morrison expressly
warned against such an expansion of power. This conclusion does not
suggest, however, that the courts in Marek and Weathers failed to
apply the proper legal analysis. Rather, it suggests that the Supreme
Court should reformulate the constitutional standards announced in
Lopez and Morrison if it truly intends to limit Congress's commerce
power.
285. Indeed, Congress's response to Lopez was to reenact the Gun Free School Zones Act
with an additional requirement that the gun had moved in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922
(2000).
286. See supra Part III for a detailed discussion of Marek and Weathers.
287. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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This Note has identified and explained two reformulated
constitutional standards that are designed to achieve the Court's
federalist objectives. Under the first standard, the Court would
eliminate the three-category framework and extend the "substantial
effects" requirement to all commerce-based statutes. Under this
proposed standard, Congress would be permitted to regulate economic
activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. In addition, Congress could regulate noneconomic
activities, but only if it could prove that individual instances of the
regulated activity have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
This standard would prevent Congress from regulating most crimes
which, by their very nature, are noneconomic. This standard preserves
the states' traditional responsibility for defining and enforcing
criminal law.
Under the second proposed standard, the Supreme Court would
retain the existing three-category framework and add a fourth
category to govern congressional regulation of the use of interstate
communication facilities. Congress would be permitted to regulate
within the fourth category only if an interstate communication facility
is used to facilitate contact between persons located in different states.
This standard would prevent the federal courts from asserting
jurisdiction in cases in which a purely local crime "ha[s] taken on ...
interstate qualit[ies] because of the means by which beepers, cellular
phones, email, and telephones function."290 Thus, this standard
ensures that the states will retain primary responsibility for the
administration of criminal justice.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court should adopt the proposed four-
category Commerce Clause framework, rather than eliminating the
three-category framework and adopting a uniform Commerce Clause
standard. The four-category framework is preferable for two primary
reasons. First, it represents a less drastic departure from the Supreme
Court's existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, the fourth
category would only apply in a limited number of cases where federal
jurisdiction is allegedly based on the defendant's use of an electronic
communication device in furtherance of the crime. The uniform
standard, on the other hand, would apply in all cases in which federal
jurisdiction is based on Congress's commerce power. Due to the
breadth of the uniform standard, courts would experience difficulty in
implementing the new standard and are likely to produce inconsistent
results given the lack of relevant case law. Second, the four-category
framework is extremely simple and will produce consistent results in
290. United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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the federal courts. The uniform standard, on the other hand, requires
the federal courts to make complex legal determinations that involve a
great degree of judicial discretion. Thus, the uniform standard is
unlikely to produce consistent results in the short term.
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